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EDITORIAL.
ON READING AUTHORITIES IN
COURT.
The important distinction ought never
to be ignored by lawyers between controversies in court which must be decided
instanter, and those the disposal of which
is not to be immediate. In jury trials,
questions of evidence or of substantive law
need to be dispatched at once. Shall such
a witness be allowed to testify ? Shall such
a piece of evidence be heard? The court
cannot be adjourned nor its business arrested in order to give time to consult the
authorities. The lawyer, then, should be
ready to cite the appropriate text, and to
read so much of it as it is necessary to read
in order to convince the judge that it has
been properly interpreted by him. When,
at the end of the trial, the court is requested
to propound certain legal principles to the
jury, it may again become necessary to
establish the accuracy of such principles in
a similar way. In all such cases, however,
excess of quotation ought to be sedulously
avoided.
Otherwise the attorney will
awaken the suspicion that he does not
remember the facts, or that he does not
comprehend the principles, or that he is
unable to find fit expression for them. It
is of vast importance to him that he gain
the reputation with the judge of using no
cases that he does not fully comprehend
and remember, and of always handling his
authorities with scrupulous candor.
But, there are many arguments before

the court which are not to be immediately
followed by a determination. The court
will have time to read the authorities cited.
It will read them more quickly, more understandingly andwith greater confidence
in the correctness of the impressions it derives from them, than it could listen to
them. Of what advantage then is the oral
perusal of them by counsel? Mlany lavyers have not learned how to read; important words or phrases are slurred over,
unimportant words are unduly emphasized, the enunciation is too rapid or jerky,
the tones, gestures, manner of the reader
divert attention from the language read.
The court pays languid heed because it
expects to read the case for itself. It is
impatient, it is bored. It also believes that
counsel are reading in default of adequate
study of the case, or of competent understanding of them, or of faculty to state originally their facts or law. The lawyer that
convinces the court that he appreciates its
time, and confides in its thoroughly investigating at chambers or in the library, is
sure to command its close and benevolent
attention. The rise to address the court of
an attorney who has formed the contrary
reputation is often a signal for consternation and despair.

Capt. Pratt kindly furnished the students with admission tickets to the Commencement exercises of the Indian School,
held during the early part of March. The
exercises were exceedingly interesting.
Capt. Pratt's work will lie as an exampe
of what the love for humanity can accomplish.
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THE ALUMNI.
Robert A. Henderson, of Altoona, class
of '94, served as a juror in the U. S. Circuit
Court held at Scranton during the last
week of March. -r. Henderson is enjoying a good practice at Altoona.
Albert S. Heck, '92, located at Coudersport, is District Attorney for the county.
He was recently prosecutinag attorney in
an important homicide case, and concerning his excellent work the Coudersport
Enterprise said: "IMr.Heck made an able
appeal for justice and the maintenance of
the law. He tore in shreds the testimony
of the experts who had attempted to show
that she was of unsound mind and after a
talk of forty-five minutes, asked the jury
to weigh carefully all the evidence given
and closed by saying that the blood of the
innocent child was crying out for vengeance, and that he expected of them a
verdict of guilty. His plea was a masterly
effort and all who heard it remarked.upon
its brevity and conciseness."
J. S. Omwake, '96, was recently elected
to the office of solicitor for the borough of
Shippensburg. Mr. Omwake has been doing good legal work and is rapidly acquiring a desirable clientage.
Quinn T. Mickey, '93, is also located at
Shippensburg, where he is enjoying an excellent practice. He is a frequent visitor
at the county court-house.
John A. Hartman, '96, opened an office
at Riverton, Cumberland county, several
months ago. He speaks hopefully of the
future, and having the field practically to
himself, will no doubt meet with great
success.
Francis J. Weakley, '95, for a short time
was associated in the practice of his profession with his father in Carlisle, but since
January, '96, has been practicing in Reynoldsville, Jefferson county, Pa. Although
an entire stranger in that section of the
State, he has more than realized his anticipations and his prospects are very
bright.

Joseph C. Kissell, of the class of '94, practices in Carlisle. He occupies an office on
Court House Avenue with J. Ed. Barnitz,
Esq. Besides attending to his practice he
does considerable work along musical lines.
He is at present director of the College
glee club.
Walter M. Sage, '96, is principal of the
schools of Sterling, N. J. He is contemplating the taking ofa post-graduate course
in law.
Robert J. Campbell, '96, of Kane, Pa.,
spent a few days in Carlisle during the latter part of March. His many friends in
the school were pleased to see him. He
has had considerable legal work to do since
graduation.
H. D. Carey, '96, of Jermyn, Lackawanna county, Pa., visited Carlisle for a few
days during the week of the Indian school
commencement in the early part of March.
He gives a favorable report of himself, as
well as of his classmates located in his
county.
Herman Berg, Jr., '96, of Carlisle, lately
moved from the Henderson Block to an
elegantly fitted-up suite of offices in the Y.
M. C. A. building.
Among the prominently spoken-of aspirants for the postmastership of Carlisle is
John M. Rhey of the class of '96. No more
capable man than Mr. Rhey could be
found, and we wish him success.
C. W. Albert Rochow, of the class of '96,
is a member of the school again this year,
taking a post-graduate course. He is still
taking an active part in athletics.

THE SCHOOL.
The Edward Thompson Company has
generously donated to the Dickinson
School of Law a complete set of the second
edition of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law. The student body has
unanimously adopted the following resolutions in regard to the gift:
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WHEREAS, We, the committee, on be-

half of the students of the Dickinson School
of Law, realize the benefit and advantage
to be derived from the possession of such a
complete and exhaustive work as the 2nd
edition of the American and English Encyclopedia of Law in our library; therefore
be it
Resolved, That we extend to the Edward
Thompson Company our sincerest thanks
for the magnanimity displayed by the said
company in donating the same; and be it
further
Resolved, That we do all within our
power to further the interests of said company by recommending the said work to
the student body and the profession at
large ; and be it further
Resolved, That we publish these resolutions in TrE FORUM of the Dickinson
School of Law and spread the same upon
the records of the School.
Geo. B. Somerville, Paul H. Price, H.
Clay Beistel, Claude L. Roth, Harry M.
Persing, Martin F. Duffy, Committee.
President Reed has agreed to deliver two
lectures on " Forensic Eloquence" before
the students of the Law School. The first
will be given during the latter part of April
and the second early in May.
The senior class has appointed a committee to look into the advisability of wearing gowns at their graduation in June.
The sentiment seems to be in favor of
gowns.

The four hundred mark in the enrollment of students was passed this month by
Dickinson College. This is the highest
number of students ever in the institution
at one time. It is a compliment to the energetic work of President Reed. When he
became the head of Dickinson, there were
but eighty students in the college.
The Edward Thompson Company of
Northport, Long Island, offer a prize of
The Encyclopedia of Practice and Pleading to the member of the graduating class
who stands highest in that branch assigned by the faculty as the one upon
which competition will be based. The
work consists of nine volumes, recently
published.

Geo. B. Somerville will deliver the Commencement oration at the graduation exercises, having been selected for that purpose by Dean Trickett.
A meeting of the law students was held
March 19th for a purpose of which the following challenge was the outcome:
To the Presidentof the Belles Lettres Society :
Recognizing your society as the champion of Dickinson College in debate and in
deference to a popular sentiment favoring
an annual contest between the College and
the School of Law, we challenge your society to a public debate under conditions that
may be arranged by committees representing both organizations.
J. HARRIS WILLIAMS.

SLMO

P. NORTHRUP.
G. H. M OYER.

The Belles Lettres Society met on iarch
31st and decided not to accept the challenge. Their answer was disappointing to
the law students, who took the ground that
the Belles Lettres should defend in debate
the victory won in the inter-society contest. The reasons of refusal, which are
not officially given, are galling also. It is
to be regretted that the series could not
have been arranged, for mutual benefit
would have resulted to the organizations,
as well as furnishing an event of interest
to the students and the public.
A number of law students are candidates
for positions on the college base-ball team.
From present indications, the law school
will have a good representation on the club
this season.
THE SOCIETIES.
The most amusing moot court case of the
winter was one tried before the Allison Society Wednesday evening, March 24th. It
was a breach of promise suit before a jury
of six. S. M. Leidich, Esq., of the Cumberland county bar, sat as judge. The evidence was of a laughable character and
both the attorneys engaged for the plaintiff and the defendant conducted their
cases well. Mr. Leidich gave a number of
interesting points during the progress of
the trial which were very much appreciated.
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After a well argued case in which D. M.
Graham, Esq., of the Cumberland county
bar, sat as judge, the Dickinson Law Society, on Friday evening, March 27, elected
the following members to office for the ensuing term: President, Joseph F. Biddle;
Vice President, John E. Small; Secretary,
Martin R. Herr; Treasurer, Harry M.
Persing; Prothonotary, P. E. Radle; Recorder, Martin F. Duffy; Register of Wills,
E. L. Ryan; District Attorney, Paul J.
Schmidt; Sheriff, Frederick C. Miller;
Justice of the Peace, Robert Stucker; Sergeant-at-arms, James O'Brien. Messrs.
Morgan, Moser and Treibly compose the
new Executive Committee.
At a meeting of the Allison Society on
March 31, the following were elected as
officers for the ensuing term: President,
George W. Benedict, Jr.; Vice President,
G. H. Moyer; Secretary, Cleon N. Berntheisel; Treasurer, Charles E. Horn; Prothonotary, J.A. Haas ; District Attorney,
E. S. Livingood; Sheriff, Thomas K.
Leidy; Justice of the Peace, Sylvester
Sadler; Auditors, H. H. Griswold, H. F.
Kantner; Executive Committee, Charles
E. Daniels, G. H. Moyer and E. H. Hoffman.

upon them by virtue of the office, and the
treatment that is due prisoners while in the
custody of constables. The lecture was
practical and to the point; one of those
that students cannot well afford to miss.
On Wednesday evening, March 17, J.W.
Wetzel, Esq., than whom there is none
better known at the Cumberland county
bar, addressed the joint societies on the
subject of "Judgments." Mr. Wetzel explained the different forms and the method
of procedure of each. He illustrated by
cases drawn from his own practice, and
gave the students of the school a clear-cut
talk, replete with pithy instruction. That
Mr. Wetzel's address was highly appreciated was manifested by the very hearty
greeting extended to him by the students.

THE MOOT COURT.
FRANK SMITH vs. R. ML DALE.
Landlord and tenant-epairs-Landlord not liablefor work done by mechanic
at tenant's request.
Assumpsit for work done.

LECTURES BEFORE THE SOCIETEIS.
John T. Stuart, Esq., a prominent member of the Cumberland county bar for a
number of years, gave a very entertaining
lecture before the school on Friday evening, March 12th. Mr. Stuart took for his
subject, "Amenities of the Bar." Hegave
in a very interesting way a number of
reminiscences, each one bringing out a legal principle. At the conclusion of his
address he was given a hearty vote of
thanks.
Chester C. Bashore, Esq., of the class of
195, now a member of the Cumberland
county bar, lectured before the joint societies on Friday evening, March 19th, on
"The Powers and Duties of a Constable."
Mr. Bashore spoke briefly of the origin of
the word and office, setting it down as one
of the most ancient offices of the realm of
peace. He then unfolded the law with regard to constables making arrests with and
without a warrant, the duties incumbent

Case stated.

WARREN H. SmocK and J. HAVEY
LINE for the plaintiff.

Landlord is liable for general repairs.Scheerer v. Dickson, 3 Erewst. 276; MeAlphin v. Powell, 70 N. Y. 126; Brown v.
Weaver, 17 W. N. C. 230; Brolasky v.
Loth, 5 Phila. 81; Long v. Fitzsimmons,
1 W. & S.520.
Agency quasi ex contractu arises from
absolute necessity to have repairs made. Clark Contracts, p. 715; Kemp v. Pryor, 7
Ves. 246; Webster v. Seekamp,4B, &Aid.
353; Benjamin v. Dickham, 134 Mass. 418.
TM.R. HEnR and WALTER G. TREnBLY
for defendant.
Landlord is not bound to pay for repairs
ordered by tenant unless he agrees to do
so, or where duty is regulated by statute.
Tenant is bound for ordinary repairs.
Hitner v.E-e, 23 Pa. 305; Long v. Fitzsimmons, 1 W. & S. 530; Kline v. Jacobs,
68 Pa. 57; Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429;
Wheeler v. Crawford, 86 Pa. 327; Reeves
v. McComeskey, 168 Pa. 571.
Defendant is not liable on implied contract. Prescott v. Otterstatter, 85 Pa. 534;
Myers v. Burns, 35 N. Y. 269; Clark on
Contracts, p. 511.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

On December 30, 1895, George Franklin,
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a tenant of a house in Carlisle, belonging
to Mrs. Dale, discovered that the water
pipes leading into the house had burst and
that he and his family were unable to obtain water in the usual way. He immediately went to Mrs. Dale's house, in
order to notify her of the breakage, but
found that she had gone to Harrisburg,
and that the time of her return was un1known. Franklin then called on Smith, a
plumber, informing him of the state of
the pipes. He named his landlady and said
that she would probably pay him for the
work to be done. Smith repaired the
pipes and sent his bill for $9, to Mrs.
Dale. The bill was reasonable in amount,
but Mrs. Dale refused to pay it. Smith
brings this assumpsit.
Smith's work was done without the request of Mrs. Dale. That being so, ordinarily, he could not compel her to pay for
it. One man cannot benefit another, without his consent, and oblige him to pay for
the benefit. There can be no recovery,
therefore, unless the relation between Mrs.
Dale and George Franklin conferred on the
latter the authority to impose a debt on
the former, in behalf of Smith.
It will not be pretended that a tenant,
qua tenant, has authority to make any
contracts whatever, for the improvement
or reparation of the demised premises.
Certain repairs, it is the duty of the tenant to make, e. g. of windows, of doors,
Long v. Fitzsimmons, 1 W. & S. 530; of. a
fence; Mumford v. Brown, 6 Cowan, 475;
Taylor, Landlord & T. 343; 12 Am. &
Eng. Encyc. 720. If he makes them, he
simply discharges his duty towards the
landlord. He does not impose on the
landlord an obligation either to reimburse
him, or to pay the person who, at the tenant's instance, has furnished the material
or labor. Kline v. Jacobs, 68 Pa. 57;
Hitner v. Ege, 23 Pa. 305. Other repairs
the tenant is not bound to make for the
benefit of the landlord, nor is the landlord
bound to make them for the benefit of the
tenant, in the absence of a covenant;
Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429; Reeves v. McComeskey, 168 Pa. 571; Wheeler v. Crawford, 86 Pa. 327; Long v. Fitzsimmons, 1
W. & S. 530; Witty v. Matthews, 52 N. Y.
512; Taylor, Landlord & T. 327; or of a
statute imposing the duty, e. g. of repairing the pavement, Hitner v. Ege, 23 Pa.

305. Thus, the landlord is not obliged to
put on a new roof, Suydam v. Jackson, 54
N. Y. 450; or to erect a new side wall after
the owner of the adjacent lot has removed
it, Moore v. Weber, 71 Pa. 429; or to repair
a leaking roof, Walz v. Rhodes, 1 W. N.
C. 49; or to shore up the building, and
drain it by a sewer, Arden v. Pullen, 10
M. & W. 321. He need not repair the
water pipes so as to keep up a supply of
Croton water, Coddington v. Dunham, 3
Jones & S. 412 (N. Y.); nor a pump from
which the house derives its water, Pomfret v. Ricroft, 1 Saund. 321; Taylor, Landlord & T. 328. It is impossible to harmonize with the current of decision,
Scheerer v. Dickson, 7 Phila. 472, and
Brolaskey v. Loth, 5 Phila. 81, in which
it was held that the tenant could defend
against the rent, for the landlord's failure
in the former to cleanse a privy, and, in
the latter, to repair a leaking roof. See
Jackson, Landlord & T. 581.
But, even when the landlord is under
obligation to make repairs, on account of
his covenant, or otherwise, he must be
notified that they are necessary, and a
reasonable time must be allowed him for
making them. Taylor, Landlord & T.
330; Gerzebek v. Lord, 33 N. J. L. 240;
12 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 724.
Had the tenant Franklin, had the power
to compel Mrs. Dale, his landlord, to make
the repairs, or to reimburse him for his
expenditures in making them, he could
not impart to Smith a right of action
against Dale. There are a few special cases
in which one man may by a species of constructive agency, make obligations for another towards a third person; e. g. a consignee of goods, a common carrier, a wife
or child. We have discovered no recognition of such constructive agency in a tenant with respect to the demised premises.
Had, however, Franklin had the right of
action,his name might have been substituted as plaintiff, to the use of Smith. The
incurable vice of the action is, that there
was no liability on Mrs. Dale towards
anybody for the cost of the reparation of
the pipes.
It was suggested, at the argument, that
serious harm to the premises as well as to
the ;furniture of Franklin, would have
happened, if the water had not been
turned off. The avoidance of injury to
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his furniture, was motive enough to Franklin, to arrest the flow of the water. The
desire to secure a continuance of the water
supply was inducement enough to cause
him to procure the repair of the pipes.
For the cost of this benefit to hhnself he
cannot make the landlord pay. As respects
any benefit to the landlord, he, not the tenant, is to judge whether it shall be procured at his expense.
Judgment is entered for the defendant
in the case stated.

Eq. 233; P. & C. R. R. Co. v Allegheny,
63 Pa. 126; N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Nichols,
119 U. S. 296; Warren v. King, 108 U. S.
398; Park v. Grant Locomotive Works, 40
N. J. Eq. 117.
At this late date and after the dividend
has been paid out to the holders of common stock, the preferred stockholders
cannot ask for 3 per cent. more dividend
for 1893.-Elkins v. Camden, etc., R. R.
Co., N. J. Eq. 233. 36
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Lanarck Rolling Mill Co., was incorporated under the act of April 29, 1874, 1
P. & L. 934 et. seq. Common and preferred stock was issued, the certificates
HENRY D. BOLLES vs. LANARCK
of the latter declaring the holders entitled
ROLLING MILL CO.
to dividends of 10 per cent. from the net
earnings of each year, when declared by
Preferred stock-Common stock-Dividends--igkts of holders of preferred the directors, before the payment of any
dividend on the common stock. In the
stock -Improvement.
year 1894, the directors declined to declare
any dividend on any stock because the
Bill in Equity.
liabilities of the company were very large
HARVEY E. KNUPP and BLAKE IRVIN
on account in part of extraordinary exfor complainant.
pense incurred for improved machinery.
The preferred stockholders are entitled
to the full 10 per cent. dividend for 1893.
In 1893 a dividend of 7 per cent. on the
-Act
29th Apr., 1874,
16, P. L. 75;
preferred stock, and of 2 per cent. on the
Boardman v. L. S. and M. S. Ry. Co. 84
common, had been declared. This bill
N. Y. 157; Williston v. MN.S. and N. J. R.
filed by a preferred stockholder, prays for
R. Co., 95 Mass. 400; W. C. and P. R. R.
v. Jackson, 77 Pa. 321; McLean v. Plate a decree that the directors declare and
Glass Co., 159 Pa. 112; Elkinsv. C. and A.
pay a dividend of 10 per cent. on the
R. R. Co., 36 N. J. Eq. 233; Park v. Grant
preferred stock and an additional diviLocomotive Works, 40 N. J. Eq. 114;
Bailey v. Railroad Co., 84 U. S. 96; N. Y. dend of 3 per cent. to make up the
etc., R. R. Co. v. Nichols, 119 U. S. 307;
deficit of 1893. The net profits of 1894,
Taylor, Corporations 563; Warren v.
not deducting therefrom the extraordinary
King, 108 U. S. 389; Am. and Eng. Ency.
expenditures, are enough to pay the diviof Law, Vol. 23, p. 603.
A dividend of 10 per cent. on the pre- dends sought. These expenditures have
ferred stock should be declared for 1894.correspondingly increased the value of the
Thompson v. Erie R. R. 89 Mass. 512;
assets. The sum distributed as a two per
Belfast R. R. v. City of Belfast, 77 Me.
445; Richardson v. Vermont R. R., 44 Vt. cent. dividend in 1893, among the holders
613; Rts., Rem., and Pr., 665. The con- of common stock, would have been more
tract by which the directors are bound than sufficient to pay 3 per cent. on the
makes no provisions for improvements,
preferred stock. The answer of the deand if such are made, the cost cannot be
fendant alleges that the directors had for
subtracted from the amount that should
be divided among the preferred stock- the reasons stated supra, deemed it inholders.-Brann's Appeal, 105 Pa. 414;
expedient to declare any dividends.
Bailey v. R. R. Co., 84 U. S. 96; ClearThe preferred shareholder is entitled to
water v. Meredith, 68 U. S. 25. The directors did not act in good faith.-W. C. and receive 10 per cent. from the net earnings
of each year; and only out of the net earnP. R. R. v. Jackson, supra.
GEo. W. BENEDICT, JR., and J. P. Cos- ings. 2 Thomp. Corporations 2236. But,TELLO for defendant.
the right to a dividend, even out of the
Directors have the discretionary power, net earnings, is not absolute. The direcas to whether the profits will justify a
tors may exercise a judgment as to the
declaration of a dividend.-McLean v.
propriety of declaring such a dividend,
Plate Glass Co., 159 Pa. 112; Culver V.
Reno Real Estate Co., 91 Pa. 367; Mc- and, although their discretion is not absoGregor v. Home Ins. Co., 33 N. J. Eq. 181; lute and irreviewable, by the courts, they
Elkinsv. C. and A. R. R. Co., 36 N. J.
will not overide it, unless it clearly ap-
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pears that they have not acted properly, in
view of the claims both of the shareholders, the creditors, and the public served by
the corporation. McLean v. Plate Glass
Co., 159 Pa. 112; New York, etc., R. R. v.
Nichols, 119 U. S. 296. The declaration
of a dividend is the expression of the
judgment of the directors, that a fund is
available for distribution among the stockholders, but in a proper case, they may be
restrained by a court of equity, from actually paying out the money; i. e. their
decision of the propriety of the dividend
may be reversed. Davison v. Gillies, 16
Chanc. Div. 347.
The directors of the Lanarck Rolling
Mill Company divided in 1893, among the
holders of preferred and common stock,
enough money to pay 10 per cent. to the
holders of the preferred. To these, however, only 7 per cent. was allotted. This
was a clear breach of duty on the part of
the directors. What remedy have the injured stockholders? They cannot sue the
common shareholders thus over-paid.
Whether the directors are personally liable
to the preferred stockholders, or whether
the corporation could recover back the
money improperly paid them, it is unnecessary to decide. Dent v. London Tramways Co., 16 Chanc. Div. 344. We think
it quite clear that the company both can
and must withhold from them, when a future dividend is declared, a sumsufficient to
indemnify the preferred stockholders, for
while these can receive dividends each
year, only out of the profits of that year,
the corporation has paid a portion of the
profits of 1893, belonging to them, to the
common stockholders.
But, the particular redress sought by this
bill, is neither the repayment of money
improperly received by the common stockholders, nor the subtraction from a dividend for 1894, made to them of enough to
replace this money. It is rather a command to the directors that they shall make
a dividend, which, in their judgment it
would be injudicious to make, sufficient to
pay 10 per cent. for the current year, to
the preferred stockholders, and 3 per cent.
for the preceding year.
It appears, by the bill-and answer, that
the net profits of 1894 are enough to pay
13 per cent. on the preferred shares. By
net profits, we understand so much of the

income of the mill for the year 1894, as is
left after paying the expenses (other than
those for new machinery) and after diverting enough to restore the capital to the
position it was in at the beginning of the
year; Dent v. London Tramways Co., 16
Chan. Div. 344; 2 Thompson, Corp. 2268;
or "what is left after paying current expenses and interest on debt and everything
else which the stockholders, preferred and
common as a body corporate, are liable to
pay." Warren v. King, 108 U. S. 389.
After a declaration of what was equivalent at least to 10 per cent. on the preferred
stock, last year, and an improper diversion
of a three-tenths of this sum to the common shareholders, we find it impossible to
place implicit reliance on the good faith,
and prudence of the directors. The machinery in the mill earned this dividend.
The improved machinery, if it is to increase the mill's efficiency, is to be especially beneficial to the common stockholders by earning for them dividends that
would not have been otherwise earned.
We think it is but equitable that so much
as equals that portion of the dividend of
1893 that was improperly awarded to the
common shareholders, should be now
awarded to the preferred shareholders. Cf.
Dent v. London Tramways Co., 16 Chanc.
Div. 344. Let a decree to this effect be
drawn up.

A. W. LEONARD vs. J. C. PIERCE.
Wages-Set-off-Section 1, Act 20 May,
1891, interpreted.
Rule for set-off.
W. L. SNYDBR and EDvIN G. HUTCHINSoN for plaintiff.
(1)The Act 20 May, 1891, is unconstitutional.
(a) Impairs obligation of contracts.-Art
1, See. 17, Constitution of Penna.
(b) Violation of indefeasible right to acquire, possess and protect property and the
pursuit of happiness.-Art. 1, Sec. 1, Constitution of Penna.-Commonwealth v.
Isenberg 4 Pa D. R. 579 ; Commonwealth
v. MarchA, 14 b. C. 369; Waters v. Wolf,
162 Pa. 171.
(c)It is a local or special law relating to
mining.-Art. 3, Sec. 7, Constitution of
Penna.
(d) It impairs the rights of persons sui
juris to make contracts.-Godcharles v.
Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; Waters v. Wolf,
supra.

THE FORUM.
(2) Plaintiff cannot be deprived of his
right to set-off except by his express consent.-Lloyd's Appeal, 95 Pa. 518.
(3) Judgment containing waiver of exemption law may be set oTf against judgment not containing such a waiver.-Riehl
v. Vockroth, 10 C. C. 657 ; Shoemaker v.
Flosser, 8 C. C. 479.
HARRY M. PERSING and PAUL J.
SCHIIDT for the defendant.
(1) Allowance of set-off would be a violation of the Act of May 20, 1891, 1.
(2) An ordinary judgment cannot be set
off against ajudgment i0r wages.-Boscher
v. Ziaurer, 5 Pa. C. C. 215; Frutchey v.
Lutz, 167 Pa. 237.
(3) Allowing such set-off would be practically an evasion of 5, Act 15 Apr., 1845,
1 P. & L. Dig. 1946; Catlin v. Ensign, 29 Pa.
264.
(4) Agreement by laborer to waive proviso exempting wages from attachment is
void.-Firmstone v. Mlack, 49 Pa. 387; Still
v. McKerrihan, 172 Pa. 280.
(5) Defendant was engaged in mining
business and therefore within the Act of
Mfay 20, 1891.-Stoughton's Appeal, 88 Pa.
198; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229.
ONINION OF THE COURT.
During Dec. 1895 and Jan. 1896, J. C.
Pierce was employed by Leonard about an
oil well, and on Jan. 20th he sued A. W.
Leonard for his wages before ajustice of the
peace, recovering a judgment of $70. On
appeal, judgment was affirmed by default
May 4, 1896. On Dec. 1, 1895, J. C. Pierce
had given to R. A. Prindle a judgment
note with a waiver of exemption. The
note was assigned by Prindle to A. W.
Leonard on Feb 1, 1896. On 16th March,
1896, Leonard entered ajudgment thereon
for $96. Leonard obtains a rule on Pierce
to show cause why his judgment should
not be set off against that of Pierce.
To this set-off it is objected (1) that it
would contravene the 1st section of the Act
of May 20, 1891; 2 P. & L. 4801, which requires inter alia that "laborers * * at manual * * * work in the business of mining"

shall receive payment of their wages "in
lawful money of the United States." This
act is, in some respects but not in this,
a modification of the act of May 23, 1887,
and in a well considered opinion, Pershing,
J., held in Bosche v. Maurer, 5 Pa. C. C.
215, that under the act of 1887, the employer could not set off against the employee's
judgment for wages, a judgment held by
him against the employee founded on a
book account. No question was made con-

cerning the constitutionality of the act of
1887.
Pierce's endeavor to prevent the set-off,
by reason of the act of 1891, is resisted by
the denial of the constitutionality of that
act. Its constitutionality is assailed because (a) it impairs the obligation of contracts; Art. 1, sec. 17, Constitution of Pennsylvania; (b) it violates the indefeasible
right to acquire, possess, and protect property and to pursue happiness; Art. 1 sec. 1
Constitution; (c) it is a local or special law
regulating mining; Art. 3 sec. 7, Constitution; (d) it impairs the right of persons sui
juris to make contracts.
For the first two of these reasons, the act
of 1891 has been adjudged unconstitutional
in Commonwealth v. Isenberg, 4 D. R.
579. The court refrained from determining
whether it is constitutional or not in Com.
v. Marsh, 14 Pa. C. C. 369, the statute, even
if valid, not applying to the facts. We
cannot think the statute void for either of
the first two reasons assigned. To prohibit
the making of a contract is not to impair the
obligation of a contract. This is so manifest that we deem discussion of itunnecessary. To regulate, restrain, and prohibit
acts of various sorts is so much the function
of government that we find it difficult to
accept the suggestion that the restriction
imposed by the act of 1891 invades indefeasible rights to property, person, or happiness.
The act is a law regulating mining. As
such it is invoked by Pierce. He assumes
therefore that the business in which he was
employed is in the sense of the act of 1891
mining. In this he is correct; Steighton's

Appeal, 88 Pa. 198; Funk v. Haldeman, 53
Pa. 229. The act is not alocal law regulating
mining. Is it a special law? A law making "mining" a distinct class of operations
and regulating it as such class, is tacitly
allowed by the constitution. It is only a
special law regulating this class that is prohibited. It is special only as it attempts
to deal with the payment of labor. But
in this respect it is no more special than
such legislation requiring mine inspectors,
bosses, etc., etc., whose constitutionality is
beyond debate. To deny thatlabor is alegitimate subject fo' legislation, as a class,
would erase from the statute books many
laws that are frequently invoked, and
whose validity is not impugned. As "min-
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ing" may be the subject of law and "labor" another subject of law, we are not able
to conclude that "labor in the business of
mining" may not be a proper subject of
law.
Is the fourtli alleged cause of unconstitutionality decisive? After much demur,
we feel constrained to say that, as to some
applications of the act, it is. The act of 29
June, 1881, P. L. 147, ordaining that persons engaged in certain business should
pay their employees "in lawful money of
the United States or by the cash order,"
was adjudged unconstitutional in Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431, as an attempt " to do what, in this country, cannot
be done, that is, prevent persons who are
suijurikfrom making their own contracts."
This decision, though sharply criticised by
a writer in the Am. Law Review of 1894,
and declared to rest on " very flimsy
grounds "by the annotator of P. & L. Dig.
4802, has been endorsed in Waters v. Wolf,
162 Pa. 153. In so far therefore as the act
of 1891 prohibits contracts to pay employees in something other than money, we
should feel compelled to declare it unconstitutional. But, it would not follow that
it would be void, as respects cases in which
there is no contract concerning the substance in which payment of wages is to be
made. There is xo such contract in this
case. We cannot satisfy ourselves that the
legislature is unable to require, when a
contract of employment without specification of mode of compensation is made,
that it shall be discharged by the actual
payment of the money and not by a set-off
of a counter-demand. The right to set-off
is the creature of the law, and can be withdrawn by the same power that conferred
it.-Bosche v. Mlaurer, 5 Pa. C. C. 215.
Another objection to the set-off is that it
would defeat the policy of the law in regard
to the attachment by creditors of employees,
of their wages. The fifth section of the act
of 15th April, 1845, 1 P. & L. 1946 declares
that " the wages of any laborers * * * shall
not be liable to attachment in the hands of
the employer." Leonard under this act
would have been prohibited after getting
a judgment against Pierce, from issuing
an attachment execution thereon, and attaching the wages in his own hands due
to Pierce. But if lie is permitted to set off
the judgment for wages, he procures the

application of the wages to his debt in a
similar way. The policy of the act of 1845
is plainly to prevent the interception of the
wages before they reach the employee, by
any creditor.
Another objection to the set-off is, that
the judgment of Leonard against Pierce
contains a waiver of the exemption, while
that of Pierce against Leonard does not.
This objection overlooks the 1st section of
the act of March 4, 1887, 1 P. & L. 1927,
ordaining that " no exemption of property
from attachment, levy or sale, upon execution, shall be allowed upon judgment for
$100 or less obtained for wages for manual
labor." Bothjudgment debtors are equally
destitute of the right to the exemption.
But we cannot see how the absence of a
right in Pierce to deny the exemption to
Leonard could delirive Leonard of the
right of set-off of his judgment against
Pierce's. That set-off would be a means of
collecting the Pierce debt. If, the law permitting attachment, he had levied on the
debt by attachment, Pierce could not have
claiied an exemption. How then is lie
hurt when set-off instead of attachment is
the process adopted by Leonard for compelling the payment of the debt? In
Shoemaker v. Flosser, 8 Pa. C. C. 479, Rice
J., and in Bosche v. M2aurer, 5 Pa. C. C. 15,
Pershing J. held that A could not set off a
judgment against 13 against B's judgment
against A when A had no right to the exemption, as respects his debt to B, and B
had no such right as respects his debt to A
though this was denied in Riehl v. Vockroth, 10 Pa. C. C. 657 by Archibald J.
But how one who had waived his exemption could object to the set-off of a judgment against his, because the owner of that
judgment had not waived the exemption,
is difficult to conceive.
It is objected that there can be no set-off
because it appears that when Pierce recovered his judgment against Leonard before
the justice, Leonard did not possess the
judgment or the note on which it was entered. It is undoubtedly the rule that
a defendant can set off no claim, even a
judgment, that lie did not own when the
action was begun.-Huling v. Hugg, 1 W.
&S. 418. This principle does not apply,
however, to the set-off of judgment against
judgment. Either judgment creditor,
without regard to the relative age of the
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he had a judgment note against Ehrgood,
and had let others have grain and flour on
orders drawn by Ehrgood. On these accounts he alleged that Ehrgood owed him
$259, or $9.04 more than the rent. Ehrgood conceded his indebtedness for the
taxes, and for the judgment note, and for
some of the orders, to the extent of $214.96.
For this amount he allowed a credit to
Freas, and claimed as the balance of rent,
$35. He denied any larger indebtedness.
Ha L. FREAS vs. E. J. EHRGOOD.
On the 12th January, 1897, he distrained
Bent-Distress-Defalcationact--Set off on the goods of Freas on the demised
premises sufficient to produce $100. There-Double costs.
upon Freas instituted this replevin, and
Replevin.
having given a replevin bond the sheriff
GEo. B. SOMERVILLE and ALFRED JOEL
delivered the goods distrained upon to him.
FEIGHT for plaintiff.
Ehrgood avowed for rent in arrear.
A party cannot be deprived of his right
$249.96 of rent was due, on January 12,
of set-off except by hi; express consent.Lloyd's Appeal, 95 Pa. 518; Reed v. Pen- 1897. Ehrgood, as landlord, had therefore,
rose, 36 Pa. 234. All taxes, etc., are debts on that date, a right to distrain for it, unin the same right and can be set-off.less something special existed to deprive
Stuart v. Com., 8 Watts 74; Trunick v. him of such right. The only fact, whose
Gilchrist, 81 Pa. 160; Jarecki v. Hayhaving the effect to deprive him of the
maker, 138 Pa. 541.
The orders drawn on Freas were .based right to distrain is suggested, is the exon a sufficient consideration and cannot istence of counter-claims of the tenant.
be revoked. Credit must be given for all Some of these claims were conceded by
the orders.-Barse v. Morton, 43 Hun.
Ehrgood to be valid, and he has deducted
(N. Y.)
(N.
Y.) 479;
2'-). Foster v. Dayton, 10 Daly,
them from the rent. Was he bound to
If anything, only $35 is due. Being less deduct the rest?
than a month's rent, distress will not lie.
That he has voluntarily allowed some
JOSEPH F. BIDDLE and GEo. T. BROWN
of
these claims, does not preclude him from
for defendant.
disallowing the residue. One who conThere can be no set-off in replevin. The
defalcation act does not extend beyond the cedes that he owes a certain debt, is not
limits of set-off. The tenant cannot re- thereby estopped from disputing the exduce the amount of his rent, except upon istence of another debt to the same person.
a failure of consideration.-Beyer v. Fens- And it cannot matter that the alleged
temacher, 2 Wh. 95; Sterner v. Abbot, 13
W. N. C. 209; Anderson v. Reynolds, 14 creditor is his tenant; or that the proceedS. & R. 439; Philips v. 'onges, 4 Wh. ing in respect to which the admission of
225; Paterson v. Haight, 3 Wh- 150; Fair- one debt, and the denial of another, ocman v. Fluck, 5 Watts 516; Spencer v.
curs, in a proceeding, distress or otherwise,
Clinefelter, 101 Pa. 219; Mackey v. Dilfor the recovery of the rent. Unless Freas
linger, 73 Pa. 85.
If judgment is rendered in favor of the had a right to the defalcation, independdefendant, he is entitled to interest from ently of Ehrgood's allowance of it, he did
the time of distress, Beyer v. Fenste- not acquire such right by such allowance.
maker, supra, and judgment for double
costs.-Act 21st Mch., 1772, P. & L. 4106; It surely cannot be maintained, that if B,
Prescott v. Otterstatter, 85 Pa. 534; Park a debtor to A, alleges that he has four
v. Holmes, 22 W. N. C. 288.
claims against A, A is estopped from disputing the fourth claim, because he has
OPINION OF COURT.
conceded the correctness of the other three.
Ehrgood leased to Freas a grist-mill for Nor could it be successfully asserted, that
three years at the rental of $41.66 per the waiver of a right to resist the defalcamonth. On January 12, 1897, rent for six
tion of three claims, compelled the waiver
months, $249.96, was in arrear and un- of the right to resist the defalcation of the
paid. Freas had certain claims against
fourth.
Ehrgood. He had paid taxes for Ehrgood,
There was a right, doubtless, to defaljudgments or of the debts on which they
are founded, may obtain the rule for the
set-off.-Vide Melloy v. Burtis, 4 Pa. C.
C. 613, note.
As, for the reasons considered, Leonard
is not entitled to the set-off of hisjudgment
against Pierce's, but must pay Pierce in
cash, the rule for set-off is discharged.
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cate the taxes if they were taxes assessed
on the mill. This right is expressly conferred by the 6th section of the act of
April 3, 1804; 1 P. & L. 2636. The rent
may be reduced, also, for defaults of the
landlord in respect to the lease, e. g. by
eviction; by the landlord's failure to make
covenanted repairs; by a breach of warranty that the premises are, or shall remain in a certain condition; or by a
failure to compensate the tenant, as the
landlord has covenanted to do, for improvements. Fairman v. Fluck, 5 W.
516; Warren v. Caulk, 3 Wh. 192; Phillips
v. Monges, 4 Wh. 226. In no other cases
is set-off allowed, in the distress, or in the
replevin instituted by the tenant to annul
the distress. 5 W. 516; 3 Wh. 192; 4 Wh.
226, supra; Peterson v. Haight, 3 Wh. 150;
Beyer v. Fenstermacher, 2 Wh. 95; Anderson v. Reynolds, 14 S.& R. 439; Sterner
v. Abbott, 13 W. N. C. 209; Spencer v.
Clinefelter, 101 Pa. 219.
The 20th section of the act of March
20, 1810, 1 P. & L. 2549, provides for a
defalcation against a landlord's rent, by a
proceeding before a justice of the peace.
Had such proceedings been resorted to and
a defalcation adjudged, we are not now required to say whether in the replevin it
would be allowed.
The landlord has been by the replevin
retarded in his collection of his rent. He
is entitled to interest thereon, from January 12, 1897, the time when it had become due. Phillips v. Monges, 4 Wh.
225; Obermyer v. Nichols, 6 Binn. 159;
Nichols v. Jones, 166 Pa. 599; Naglee v.
Ingersoll, 7 Pa. 185.
The 10th section of the act of March 21,
1772, 2 P. & L. 4106, after authorizing the
landlord, in a replevin by the tenant, to
avow, provides that "if the plaintiff or
plaintiffs in such action shall because nonsuited, discontinue his, her, or their-action,
or have judgment given against him, her,
or them, the defendant or defendants in
such replevin shall recover double costs of
suit." The defendant, Ehrgood, being entitled to a judgment for the full amount
of the claim in the avowry, Prescott v.
Otterstatter, 85 Pa. 534, must also recover
double costs.
Judgment for the defendant for $35 with
interest from January 12, 1897, for the
costs of the distress, for double costs in this

action and for a return of the goods replevied will be entered.

JOSEPH WATSON, JR. vJOHN JONES.
Executor's liability-Appointment of attorney in fact revocable on death of rincipal.
Case stated.
CHARLES S. SHALTERS for the plaintiff.
Legatee's death revoked agency.-1 Am.
& Eng. Ency. Law, 1222 (2nd Ed.); Marlett v. Jackson, 3 Allen 287; Lincoln v.
Emerson, 108 Mass. 87; Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 W. & S. 283.
Executor knew of revocation of agency,
and is therefore liable to plaintiff.-Michigan Ins. Co., v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11;
Long v. Thayer, 150 U. S. 520; Galt. v.
Galleway, 4 Pet. 332; Cassiday v. McKenzie, supra.
A. Mi. DEWALL for the defendant.
Executor is not chargeable with misconduct, embezzlement or insolvency of his
attorney.-Bacon v. Bacon, 5 Ves. 334;
Jones v. Kline, 3 Johns, 578; Calhoun's
Estate, 6 Watts 185; Gratz v. Phillips, 1
P. & W. 343.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

John 'Watson died, leaving Joseph Watson and Amos Watson, his next of kin,
who resided in Leeds, England. He left
a legacy of $2,500 to Joseph and Amos,
and also certain lands in Huntingdon
County, Pa. His will constituted John
Jones his executor, and nominated James
Smith to be Jones' attorney. Joseph constituted Smith his attorney to receive from
Jones his legacy. On January 1, 1885,
Jones paid to Smith on account of Joseph's
legacy, $500, as attorney in fact of Joseph.
In November, 1885, Joseph Watson died,
but on January 1,1886, Jones, although he
had knowledge of the death of Joseph Watson, paid the balance of the legacy, viz:
$1,200 to Smith. Joseph Watson Jr., the
administrator of Joseph Watson, having
failed to receive the $1,200 from Smith,
who has become insolvent, amicably sues
the executor, the facts supra being incorporated into a case stated.
The only justification for paying the
$1,200 to Smith, was the fact that he bad
been appointed agent to receive it by
Joseph Watson. Without such appointment, the payment to Smith could have
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had no more power to discharge the duty
of Jones, than a payment to X, or Y, or
Z. But the past appointment of an agent,
can legitimate a present transaction with
him as such, only on the hypothesis that
the agency continues down to the date of
the transaction,or that, despite its termination, the party dealing with the agent believes and has a right to believe that the
agency continues.
The agency of Smith did not, in fact,
continue down to the time of Jones' payment to him, for Joseph Watson had then
been a month dead. No principle is better established than that the death of the
principal revokes the powers of the agent.
Marlett v. Jackman, 3 Allen, 287; Lincoln
108 Mass. 87; Cassiday v.
'%. Emerson,
McKenzie, 4 W. & S. 282; 1 Am. & Eng.
Encyc. Law, 1222 (2nd Ed.)
When an agency has once existed, and has
ceased by revocation, it might be a question whether persons who have been aware
of the agency, but have not learned of its
cessation, could continue safely to deal
with the agent. The weight of authority
is, that when the authority of the agent
is recalled by the death of the principal,
all persons, even if ignorant of the revocation, deal with the former agent at their
peril. Marlett v. Jackman, 3 Allen, 287;
1 Am. &. Eng. Encyc. Law, 122.5; Michigan Ins. Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt. 11;
Gait v. Galleway, 4 Pet. 332; Long v.
Thayer, 150 U. S. 520. In the last case it is
held that payments made by A's debtor to
B, A's agent, in ignorance of the death of
A, will not discharge the debtor. Against
very many decisions to this effect, stands
almost, if not quite solitary, the Pennsylvania case of Cassiday v. McKenzie, 4 W.
& S. 283, in which it is held that payments made by a debtor to an agent of the
creditor, in ignorance of the death of the
creditor, will be a good payment.
It is unnecessary, however, to make a
choice between the isolated decision of
Cassiday v. McKenzie and the many
authorities which it antagonizes, for in
the case stated it is distinctly confessed
that Jones had knowledge of the death of
Joseph Watson when he paid the legacy
to Smith. Bound to know the law, he
therefore knew that Smith had no authority to receive the payment. Had Smith
in fact paid the money over to Joseph

Watson, Jr., the absence of authority in
him to receive it would of course have
been immaterial. But Smith has never
Only one
paid it.
He is insolvent.
conclusion can result. The payment did
not discharge Jones.
Smith had so far the confidence of John
Watson, that he designated him to be the
legal adviser and attorney of his executor,
Jones. He did not by so doing appoint
Smith attorney in fact to receive payment
of the legacies. For any losses arising
from the employment of Smith as attorney, the testamentary nomination
might have shielded Jones from liability.
But Smith's relation to Jones as attorney
could in no way warrant the payment of
legacies to him as the medium of their
transmission to the legatees.
As then Jones has not paid the $1,200 to
Joseph Watson, or to his executor; as the
payment of $1,200 to Smith is, as respects
Watson's right, a nullity, judgment is
entered on the case stated for the plaintiff
and against the defendant for the sum of
$1,200 with interest from January 1, 1886.

ISAIAH REMINGTON vs. ISAAC FORD.
Orphans' Court-Sale of Real Estate of
Decedent-Confirmation of Sale-Collateral Attack.
Ejectment.
PAUL H. PRICE and SIMON P. NORTHn.Up for plaintiff.
The Orphans' Court may confirm a sale,
made without a previous order, with the
same effect, as if such order had preceded
such sale.-Act 13th Apr 1854, 3, 2 Purd.
1834; Klingensmith v. Bean, 2 W. 486;
Sankey's Appeal, 55 Pa. 491; Potts v.
Wright, 82 Pa. 498; Est. of James Bowker,
12 Phila. 161; Est. of Mary Charlton, 12
Phila. 102; 'Mussleman's Appeal, 65 Pa.
480.
The proceedings and decrees of the Orphans' Court cannot be questioned in a
collateral suit, unless for fraud or want of
2,
jurisdiction. -Act 29th Mch., 1832,
2 Purd. 1626; Garber v. Com., 7 Pa. 265;
Lockhart v. John, 7 Pa. 137; Rhoads' Appeal, 39 Pa. 186; Klingensmith v. Bean,
supra; Bell's Appeal, 71 Pa. 471; Phelps
v. Benson, 161 Pa. 419.
HARVEY S. KISER and CHAs. W. HAMILTON for defendant.
Decrees of the Orphans' Court may be
avoided collaterally, if such court did not
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havejurisdiction over the subject matter.Act of 29th far., 1832, ? 2, P. & L. 3273 ;
Gilmore v. Rodgers, 41 Pa. 120; McKee v.
M-cKee, 14 Pa. 231; Torrence v. Torrence,
53 Pa. 505; Snyder v. Snyder, 6 Binn. 482;
Sager v. Mead, 164 Pa. 125; Jacoby v. McMfahon:6 174 Pa. 183.
The rphans' Court did not have jurisis
diction and therefore the confirmation
of non-effect.-Walker's Appeal, 1 Gr.
434; Stiver's Appeal, 56 Pa. 9; Pry's Appeal, 8 W. 2,53; Benner v. Phillips, 9 W.
& S. 13; Jacoby v. McMahon, supra.
It is the duty of the purchaser to see
that the proceedings have been so far
regular as to authorize the sale.-Snyder
v. Snyder, supra; 'essinger v. Kintner, 4
Binn. 103.
OPINION OF COURT.

Samuel Ford died, owning five farms.
His debts amounted to $42,000. His personal assets produced at the administrator's sale, only $1,900. The administrator
applied to the Orphans' Court for authority to sell four of the farms, for the payment
of debts. The court gave the order desired.
The administrator sold the four farms,
leave to sell which had been solicited, in
his petition. They brought respectfully,
$11,423, $3,296, $17,420, and $11,000; in all
$43,139,
which, with the $1,900 of
personalty was $647.19 in excess of all the
debts and of the expense of administration. Besides selling these four, the administrator sold farm No. 5 for $3,750. He
made return to the Orphans' Court of the
sales of the five farms, and of their prices,
and they were confirmed. Isaiah Remington became the purchaser of No. 5 and
to him a deed was made. Isaac Ford, the
only child of Samuel Ford refusing to give
up the possession, this ejectment is
brought.
Ford's refusal to surrender the possession is grounded on the assumed invalidity
of the sale. If by it, his right was divested and transferred to the purchaser,
he must yield the possession to the purchaser; otherwise not. The administrator had no power to sell, except what he
got from the law, and the decree of the Orphans' Court.
When the personal estate is insufficient
to pay the decedent's debts and the expenses of administration, on the application of the administrator setting forth the
fact, the Orphans' Court may authorize a
sale of real estate. See. 31, Act March

29, 1832; 1 Purd. 598; Sect. 20, Act Feb.,
24, 1834, 1 Purd. 598. The authority of the
court does not seem to depend on the fact
that there are debts which the personalty
is insufficient to pay, Torrance v. Torrance, 53 Pa. 505; Gallaher v. Collins, 7W.
552, if the petition to the court avers the
existence of such debts. We think it in
disputable that an oral application by the
administrator will not support a decree of
sale, and that the written application
must not only name the decedent, and
aver the existence of land, but must
further aver that the personal assets have
been or will be insufficient to discharge all
the debts. Sed 57, Act March 29, 1832, 2
P. & L. 3340; Torrance v. Torrance 53 Pa.
505. On a petition averring an unpaid
legacy, but not an unpaid debt, a sale will
be void. Torrance v. Torrance, 53 Pa.
505. Samuel Ford's administrator made
written application to the Orphans' Court
for leave to sell his land. He therein
stated that the debts amounted to $42,000,
and that the personal assets had produced
at the sale but $1,900. He further described the five tract of thedeceased, and
requested authority to sell the first four.
He subsequently returned the sale of the
tracts, leave to sell which he had thus obtained, to the court, praying a confirmation thereof. The court confirmed it. It is
not disputed, nor could it be, that by this
confirmation, the ownership of the heir of
the decedent was carried over from him
to the purchaser.
But, in his return of the order to sell the
four tracts, the administrator reported to
the court that he had also sold tract No. 5,
and the confirmation was as much of the
sale of No. 5, as of that of the other four
tracts. Was the ownership of No. 5 also
carried out of Isaac Ford, the heir, to
Isaiah Remington, the vendee?
That the sale of No. 5 was not asked for
and authorized previously to the confirmation, does not invalidate it. Of a sale
which the Orphans' Court could have
authorized, its subsequent ratification will
be equivalent to the previous authorization. Mussleman's Appeal, 65 Pa. 480;
Bell's Appeal, 71 Pa. 465. "In all cases
wherein any of the courts of this Commonwealth might have authorized any
sale * * * and such sale * * * may have
been made without the leave of such court,
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it shall be lawful for such court, if -pproving of such sale *

*

*, to approve,

ratify and confirm the same, with the
same effect as if such decree had preceded
such sale **

*."

2 Purd. 1834; 2 P. & L.

4058.
But, whatever facts must appear to the
court in order to validate its order to sell,
and its subsequent confirmation of the sale,
must appear to it in order to validate a
confirmation of a sale not previously directed. An oral statement by an administrator that he had, because he thought
it wise, sold the decedent's land, would
not support a confirmation. There must
be a written report of the fact of sale;
there must be a written statement to the
court of the same facts whose averment
would have been necessary to found an
order to sell. It does not distinctly appear
what was stated by the administrator in
the return of the sale. We must assume
that he stated the facts. He then averred
that the debts had been $42,000; that the
personal fund was $1,900; that, on the order already obtained, he had sold four
tracts, and that the proceeds of their sale
was $43,139. In short, he must have made
it plain to the court that he was in possession of $3,039 more than was required to
pay the debts. Such being the facts thus
apparent to the court, it had no authority
either to order the sale of the 5th tract,
Benner v. Phillips, 9 W. & S. 13; Pry's
Appeal, 8 W. 253, or to ratify a reported
sale of it, made without prior order.
Jacoby v. McMahon, 174 Pa. 133.
But, it is suggested that there were expenses of administration and, that, so far
as the court could see, they would be more
than enough to consume the $3,039, and
would therefore require the sale of the 5th
tract. Neither the existence of debts nor
of the expenses of administration, empowers the Orphans' Court to order a sale
of the decedent's land. It must be made to
appear to the court that there is an excess
of such debts or expenses beyond the assets already in the control of the administrator, &c. But these assets, at the
time when the Orphans' Court confirmed
the sale of No. 5, were $647.19 greater than
all the debts and what has since been
found to be the expenses of administration. We think the rule a sound one to
refuse to authorize a sale, merely for the

expenses of administration until the filing
of a final account, showing a balance payable to the administrator. Grice's Estate,
2 V. N. C. 211; Kautz's Estate, 11 Pa. C.
C. 322. [The account had been adjudicated in Cobaugh's Appeal, 24 Pa. 143.]
Such settlement of the account ought to
be deemed by the court the only authentic
evidence that a balance exists for covering
which a sale of the land is necessary. If
the administrator reported the facts to the
court, there was nothing in them to legitimate the confirmation of the sale of the
5th tract.
We have not lost sight of the distinction
between irregularities on the part of the
Orphans' Court, sufficiently serious to lead
to a correction of its decree, either by itself
on review, or by the Supreme Court on
appeal, e. g. Prys Appeal, 8 W. 253;
Cobaugh's Appeal, 24 Pa. 143; but not
collaterally, McPherson v. Cauliff, 11 S.
& R. 422; Potts v. Wright, 82 Pa. 498;
Sager v. Mead, 164 Pa. 125; Klingensmith
v. Bean, 2 W. 486; and irregularities so
grave as to invalidate the decree and what
was done in conformity with it, for all
purposes, Jacoby v. Mahon, 174 Pa. 133.
The 2nd section of the Act of 29th March,
1832, declares that decrees of the Orphans'
Court "in all matters within its jurisdiction, shall not be avoided collaterally in
any other court." Gilmore v. Rogers, 41
Pa. 120; Torrance v. Torrance, 53 Pa. 505.
We regard, among the jurisdictional facts
without which the confirmation of a sale
of land by the Orphans' Court is absolutely
void, (in the absence of an estopping circumstance, Jacoby v. Mahon, supra,) (a)
a written petition; (b) by the administrator, (c) which shall aver the excess of
debts, or of ascertained administration expenses, beyond the assets at his disposal,
and (d) the decedent's seisin of real property. One of these jurisdictional facts, (c)
could not be, and therefore was not,
averred by the administrator to the court,
on his application for the confirmation of
the sale of No. 5. We hence think that
confirmation void, the sale invalid, and
the title of Isaac Ford unaffected by it.
Judgment must therefore be entered for
the defendant.
N. B.-Cf. Smith v. Wildman, 178 Pa.
245.
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tinued working for him until the beginning
of 1894, meantime studying book-keeping.
I During the year 1894, he devoted all his
Employer and employe-Breach of con- time to receiving instruction and practice
tract--Measure of damages-_easonable in that art. In the middle of Nov. 1895,
effort to secure employment.
Wright, desiring to give the place to a
nephew, informed Pettis that his services
would not be needed after Dec. 1st. No
Action in assumpsit.
ADAiR HERuAw and H. H. HESS for
position of book-keeper could be found
plaintif.
by Pettis in his town, but there were
Where one contracts to employ another several such positions in a neighboring
for a certain time at a specified compensa- city fourteen miles away, three of which
tion, and discharges him without cause
were vacant for a considerable part of the
before the expiration of the time, he is, in
general, bound to pay the full amount of year 1896, and in any of which $700 per
wages for the whole term.-Costigan v. R. year could have been earned. Pettis could
R. Co., 2 Denio (N. Y.) 609; Howard v. have resumed the trade of carpentry with
Daly, 61 N. Y. 362; 2 Story, Contracts,
his father and have earned $9 per week.
962 h; Stewart v. Walker: 14 Pa. 293;
Matthews v. Park Bros., 146 Pa. 384; Lip- In Jan. 1897 Pettis sued Wright for the
hart v. Woods, 1 W. & S. 265.
damage for dismissing him from his emA discharged servant is not bound to ployment. Pettis asks the court to inseek work in another neighborhood.-14
Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 796, Costigan struct the jury that he should recover
v. R. R. Co., supra; Gillisv. Space, 63 Barb. $758.33, the wages for the period Dec. 1st,
(N. Y.) 177. Nor to engage in work of a 1895, to Jan. 1, 1897.
more menial nature.-Gillis v. Space,
Wright asks an instruction to the jury
supra;Costigan v. R. R. Co., supra; Wolfe
v. Studebaker, 65 Pa. 459; 2 Story, Con- that it was Pettis' duty to seek work in
tracts, 962 h; Beekham v. Drake, 2 H. L. the neighboring city, that the jury should
606; Everson v. Powers,89 N. Y. 527; Fuchs assume, Pettis not showing otherwise, that
v. koerner, 107 N. Y. 529.
in a reasonable time he, Pettis, would, if
THOMAS B. PEPPER and SAMUEL B.
he had sought it, have obtained employHARE for defendant.
that in no event
A servant who has been discharged be- ment there, and further,
fore the expiration of his term, is bound could Pettis recover more than the differto make a reasonable effort to secure em- ence between what, as carpenter, he could
ployment, and if such is secured the have earned, and what he would have
money so earnedmust be deducted from the earned under the contract with him,
amount claimed for the breach. He must
do whatever he reasonably can to lessen Wright.
the injury.-Chamberlain v. Morgan, 68
Pettis' term of employment, beginning
Pa. 168; N1ixon v. Myers, 141 Pa. 477; Em- Jan. 12, 1895, was to end on Jan. 12, 1898.
mens v. Elderton, 4 H. L. 645; Bishop, Without cause, he was dismissed on Nov.
Contracts, 838; Sehouler's Domestic Relations, 661; Beekham v. Drake, 2 H. L. 12, 1895. In this action, begun in January
606; Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q, B. 583; 1897, he claims $758.33, the wages for
Shannon v. Comstock, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) thirteen months, ending with Dec. 12,
461; Wood, Master and Servant, 241;
Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 371. If the 1896.
No justification for the dismissal of
plaintiff had made a "reasonable effort"
e would have taken a position in the Pettis is pretended by Wright. The damneighboring city, or at least resumed work ages which the former has suffered are
at his former trade.
therefore prima facie, the contractual
wages for the whole term down to the
CHARGE OF COURT.
time of bringing the action.-Emery v.
Gentlemen of the Jury:Wright, a merchant, on Dec. 27, 1894, Steckel, 126 Pa. 171; King v. Steiren, 44
employed Pettis, a bookkeeper, for the Pa. 99; Fercira v. Sayres, 5. W. & S. 210;
term of three years from Jan. 13, 1895. at Costigan v. Mohawk & Hudson R. R. Co.,
the yearly salary of $700, payable in 2 Denio, 609. This is true whether, as in
monthly installments. At the time of his the above cases, the term of employment
employment, Pettis was 29 years old. With was a year or less, or whether it is longer.
his father, a carpenter and builder, he had Beckham v. Drake, 2 H. of L. 606; Embeen taught carpentering, and had con- mons v. Elderton, 4 H. of L. 645.
CHARLES PETTIS v&. JEDEDIAH
WRIGHT.
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The defendant insists, however, that
from these wages must be subtracted, (a)
what he could have earned as book-keeper
in the neighboring city, or (b) what he
could have earned as carpenter at home.
The burden of showing that by reasonable effort, Pettis would have found employment in the city is on the defendant.
Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 171; King v.
Steiren, 44 Pa. 99; Costigan v. Mohawk
etc. R. R. Co., 2 Denio 609; Howard v.
Daly, 61 N. Y. 362. Has he shown this?
He has made it clear that there were three
positions open in the city. But it does not
appear that Pettis would have been employed, had he applied. Nor has it been
shown that a reasonable effort would have
made the existence of these vacant places
known to Pettis or if at all, when? How
Wright learned of them, and when, we
know not. If Pettis was under an oblig-a
tion to visit other boroughs and cities, how
many? In what order? Was he bound
to include this neighboring city iu his
search? Must he have visited it at the
commencement of his quest? Had he
visited it, would he have learned of these
vacant book-keeperships? We do not
think it has been made plain that by
reasonable effort, he would have discovered them. What Wright has done falls
far short of showing as Kingv. Steiren, 44
Pa. 99 requires, that "employment was ofCf.
fered to him (Pettis) and rejected."
Gillis v. Space, 63 Barb. 177.
But, was he under obligation, in order
to mitigate the damages for which the defendant by his breach of contract made
himself prima facie liable, to go to this
neighboring city? He is bound to seek work
only "in the same neighborhood." Emery
v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 171. He cannot be required "to leave his home and place of
residence." Costigan v. Mohawk, etc. R.
R'.Co. 2 Denio, 609. What means of communication exist between Pettis' place of
residence and the city, does not appear. If
there is no steam or electric railroad, we
are unable to say that this city is in the
"same neighborhood" as the borough.
The duty was on Wright to disclose the
facts that would justify the allegation of
sufficient proximity.
Wright insists that it was the duty of
Pettis to return to carpentry, by doing
which he would have earned $9 per week.

Pettis doubtless could not refuse any employment because it was not precisely like
that of which Wright had deprived him.
He is nevertheless bound only to accept
work "of the same or a similarcharacter,"
Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa. 171; or "other
like employment." Gillis v. Space, 63
Barb. 177. One improperly discharged
from the superintendency of a railroad is
not obliged to "take up the business of a
farmer or a merchant." Costigan v. Mohawk, etc., R. R. Co. 2 Denio, 609. In
Gillis v. Space, supra, it is intimated
that a talented womanteacher, improperly
dismissed from a winter school, would not
be obliged to accept employment in a summer school, such school being "entirely
primary," for the purpose of diminishing
the damages of a party violating his contract. The employe is not compelled to
continue in the employer's service at a
reduced compensation, in order to relieve
the latter from a part of his liability.-14
Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 796. Pettis had
been a carpenter. But discarding that
business he had at considerable expense acquired a more remunerative one,
that of book-keeper. Wright cannot insist that he relapse to the less noble and
compensatory business, in order to partially
discharge him from a self-imposed liability.
It has been faintly urged that Pettis cannot recover because he did not offer to
continue his work. This was unnecessary.
He was in the midst of his performance of
it, when he was informed that his services
would be no longer required. He was
not bound to perform the idle ceremony of
asserting his willingness to continue to discharge his duties. We are therefore,
gentlemen of the jury, compelled to deny
the requests of the defendant. Conformably with the prayer of the plaintiff; we
instruct you that he is entitled to a verdict
for $758.33 with interest from Dec. 12,1896.

AMOS JONES vs. SAMUEL SPRAGUE.
Revival of judgment-Constructivenotice
to judgment creditor-Intermediategrantees-Notice to terre-tenantrequired.
Ejectment.
JO HN E. S-rALL and EDn
RYAN for the plaintiff.
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The plaintiff is not affected by the recording of subsequent conveyances by
grantees not connected with the record of
original title.-Patch v. Anstant, 4 W. &
S. 307; Leightner v. Mooney, 10 Watts
407; Keller v. Metz, 5 S. & R. 246; Smith
v. Eline, 18 Pa. 0. C. 560; Owner v.
Myers, 28 Pa. 134; Murphy v. Nathans,
46 Pa. 508. Fulton's Estate, 51 Pa. 204.
WILLIS E. MACKEY and THomAs K.
LEIDY for the defendant.
Act of 1849 alters prior laws to the extent that revival of a judgment against
the original debtor will not bind the terretenant when his deed is on record or he is
in actual possession of the land, and his
right to notice begins with the date of
such record or time of such possession.Act Apr. 16, 1849, 1 P. & L., 2478; Porter
v. Hitchcock, 98 Pa. 635; Buck's Appeal,
100 Pa. 109; Wetmore v. Wetmore, 155 Pa.
507.
To revive lien of a judgment against a
terre-tenant whose deed for the land has
been recorded, there must be an agreement in writing signed by said terretenant and entered upon the proper lien
docket.-Act June 1, 1887, 1 P. & L. 2474.
Even if defendant had not put his deed
on record, plaintiff is bound to give him
notice.-Armstrong's Appeal, 5 W. & S.
352.
CHARGE OF THE COURT.

Gentlemen of the Jury.Amos Jones recovered a judgment for
$493.27 against Elias Donohue on August
11, 1890. At that time Dohohue owned
several houses and lots, one of which was
No. 37 Wellington St., in the borough of
St. Mary's. Shortly after April 1, 1891,
Samuel Sprague, a real estate agent, acting for Donohue, made a lease of this
house for five years to Henry Jacobs who
took immediate possession. Six months
afterwards, Donohue ceased to employ
Sprague. On December 23,1892, Donohue
conveyed the house and lot to Moses Mendelsohn and his heirs. Mendelsohn, exactly one year afterwards, conveyed the
premises to Samuel Sprague and his heirs.
On July 17, 1895, an amicable agreement
between Amos Jones and Elias Donohue
for the revival of the judgment was filed
in the prothonotary's office. Five days
before this Samuel Sprague left with the
recorder of deeds for record his deed from
Moses Mendelsohn. That from Donohue
to Mendelsohn has never been recorded.
Jones, at the time of reviving the judgment, had no knowledge of the conveyance to Mendelsohn and to Sprague, but

on July 29, 1895, he learned of that to
Mendelsohn. Henry Jacobs remained in
possession of the premises until the expiration of his term as tenant, but attorned to Mendelsohn and then to Sprague,
paying them the installments of rent falling due after the commencement of their
respective ownerships. On March 17, 1896,
a sheriff's sale took place of the Sprague lot
on aft. fa. and vend. ex. issued on the
judgment of revival of July 17, 1895, and
Jones became the purchaser. In this
ejectment, he seeks to recover the possession from Sprague.
When the judgment for $439.27 was recovered on August 11, 1890, it became a
lien on No. 37 Wellington St., in St.
Mary's borough. The sheriff's sale of
those premises, took place on March 17,
1896, more than six years and seven
months afterwards. Meantime, theyhad
been conveyed by Dlonohue to Mendelsohn,
and by Mendelsohn to Sprague. As the
lien of the original judgment, expired on
the l1th August, 1895, the validity of the
sheriff's sale depends on the effectualness
of the revival of it. Let us observe how
this revival was attempted.
An amicable agreement for revival was
filed in the prothonotary's office. The
parties to this agreement were Amos
Jones, the plaintiff in the judgment, and
Elias Donohue the defendant. Had the
house and lot still been Donohue's, the
lien of the judgment thereon, would have
been prolonged for five years from that
date. But, two and a half years before
they had been conveyed to Mendelsohn,
and one and a half years before Mendelsohn
had conveyed them to Sprague. Prior to
the Act of April 16, 1849, 1 P. & L. 2478, the
amicable scirefacias to which the terretenant Sprague was not a party, would
not have revived the lien, as to him.
Armstrong's Appeal, 5 W. & S. 352; 1
Liens, 253.
The Act of 1849, and June 1, 1887, 1 P. &
L. 2474, have in some respects diminished
the immunity of the terre-tenant. A revival, to which the original defendant only
is a party, will be effectual, even against
the terre-tenant, unless he had given notice of his ownership either by having put
his deed on record, or by having possession. 3 Liens, 311, 312.
Did the facts exist in this casewhich ex-
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empted Sprague from the operation of the
attempted revival? The Act of 1887, declares that "no proceeding shall be available to continue the lien of said judgment
against a terre-tenant, whose deed for the
land bound by said judgment has been
recorded, except by agreement in writing
signed by said terre-tenant, and entered
on the proper lien docket, or the terretenant, or terre-tenants be named as such
in the original scire facias." If the deed
is not on record, and the terre-tenant has
no possession, the revival by agreement of
the defendant, will be valid against his
grantee. Act of Apr. 10, 1849, supra. If
the deed is on record, the grantee must be
a party to the agreement. Was then, the
deed of Sprague on record?
Mendelsohn's deed to Sprague was put
on record five days before the amicable revival, for, leaving for record is equivalent
to recording. 1 Liens, 133, 129, 3 Liens,
152. But, Donohue's deed to Mendelsohn
was never recorded. The question that
confronts us then is, is the recording by the
last of a series ofgrantees, of the deed to him
from his grantor, the prior deeds which
connect him with the defendant in the
judgment not being recorded, sufficient to
compel the plaintiff to know that he is
the terre-tenant, and tojoinhim as a party
to the amicable scire facias?
The manifest object of the Act of 1849,
and of 1887, is to furnish to the plaintiff
the means of learning of any devolutions
of ownership, and, if there be such, upon
whom it has devolved. This object could
not be accomplished if the conveyance
from the defendant in the judgment were
omitted from the record. It has been often
decided that if A has conveyed land to B,
and B has conveyed it to C, the recording
of B's deed to C, thatfrom A to B notbeing
recorded, is not notice to X who, in ignorance of the conveyance to B, accepts
another conveyance from A. Keller v. Metz,
5 S. & R. 246; Lightner v. Mooney, 10 W.
407; Tiedeman, Real Prop., 805. Jones had
no more reason to suspect that Mendeisohn
or Sprague had been grantees of the premises that than any other inhabitant of the
United States had been. There was nothing to guide him in his searches of the
records. He knew his defendant, and
was bound to consult the indexes for his
name in order to discover whether he had

granted away the land in dispute. To
compel him to know what in the records
could not be thus found, would be practically to compel him to examine every
recorded deed. We cannot but conclude,
with the court of Common Pleas ofAdams
county, that the record of Sprague's deed
alone, did not compel Jones to make him
a party to the scire facias. Smith v.
Eline, 18 Pa. C. C. 560:
Twelve days after the amicable revival,
Jones got actual notice of the deed to Mendelsohn. The record could then have
shown him the deed from Mendelsohn to
Sprague. There were still thirteen days
to run, before the five years of the lien of
the original judgment would expire, and
it is contended that Jones should in these
thirteen days have made Sprague by
amicable or adverse scire facias a party
to a new revival. We think this unnecessary.
The revival being valid when made,
continues valid for five years. It is not
avoided by the subsequent disclosure on
the record of the ownership of the terretenant. Besides, actual notice of the deed
can have no legal consequences. Wetmore
v. Wetmore, 155 Pa. 501.
We are next to ascertain whether in
default of the record of the deed, there
was other constructive notice of it. Under
the Act of April 16, 1849, theterre-tenant's
possession of the premises was equivalent
to the recording of his deed. It was constructive notice, and compelled the judgment creditor to make him a party to the
revival. Buck's Appeal, 100 Pa. 109;
Wetmore v. Wetmore, 155 Pa. 507. Was
there such possession here? The possession
may be by the terre-tenant in person orby
his tenant. 155 Pa. 507. Jacobs, lessee of
Donohue, took possession in virtue of his
lease for five years. He continued this
possession during the ownership of Mendelsohn and during that of Sprague down
to the time of the revival. He attorned
to both Mendelsohn and to Sprague.
Sprague then was through him, in possession. The mere fact that he had possession under Donohue does not make his
any the less the possession of Sprague, nor
make it the less monitory to Jones of the
ownership of Sprague. Cf. Wetmore v.
Wetmore, 155 Pa. 507, where the possession by the wife after she had acquired
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her husband's title to the land was regarded
as notice to the judgment creditor of her
title, although she had been in a similar
possession, while the land was her husband's. As then Sprague was in possession by his tenant when the amicable
scirefaciaswas filed, the Act of April 16,
1849, does not apply. (See proviso.) The
Act of June 1, 1887, does not change the
law as it was under the Act of 1827, except when the terre-tenant's deed is on
record. Under the Act of 1827, as we have
seen, an amicable scire facias to which a
terre-tenant was not a party would not
revive the judgment as to him. The lien
of Jones' judgment had therefore expired
when the sheriffs sale of Sprague's lot
took place. It could not divest his right.
The verdict of the jury must therefore be
for the defendant.

health and with a reasonable expectancy
of several years, while crossing the tracks
of the Pa. R. R. Co. in a milk-wagon,
using proper care and caution, was, by the
negligence of the R. R. Co. run into by a
train and thrown violently from his
vehicle to the ground. Suffering serious
injuries, he lingered for seven weeks, and
then succumbed to them. Before the accident, he had engaged to marry Johanna
Hendricks, and, three days before his
death, and in expectation of it, the marriage ceremony was performed. He had
property not exceeding in value $425, besides his right of action against the defendant for damages. Within one week
after his death, Johanna Fogler instituted
this action. The court declined, at the
request of the defendant to instruct the
jury that the plaintiff had shown no cause
of action. The verdict was for $2750 for
the plaintiff. We are now asked toaward
a new trial.
JOHANNA FOGLERvs. PENNA. R. R. CO.
The right to damages for death grows
outof the act of April 15, 1851; 2 P. & L.
Widows' right to suefor damagesfor in- 3233, which enacts that "whenever death
juries to her husband-" Widow" defined shall be occasioned by unlawful violence or
-Measure of damages.
negligence, and no suit for damages be
brought by the party injured in his or her
Motion for a new trial.
life, the widow of any such deceased * * *
JACKSON ORLANDO HAAS and CHARLES
may maintain an action for and recover
E. HoRIo for defendant.
damages for the death thus occasioned."
The Act of Apr. 25, 1855, does not apply The act of April 26, 1855, 2 P. & L. 3234,
because plaintiff suffered no pecuniary loss
for want of support. No mental solatium does not affect the right of the widow in
can be allowed.-North Penna. R. R. Co. this case, and may be ignored. At common
v. Robinson, 44 Pa. 175; Mansfield Coal Co. law no action could be sustained for damv. McEmery, 91 Pa. 185.
ages arising from death.-Moe v. Smiley,
The amount of damages is excessive.Dunn v. Penna. R. R. o., 20 Phila. 262; 125 Pa. 136.
Do the conditions on which Johanna
Penna. R. R. Co. v. Henderson, 51 Pa.
315; Catawissa R. R. Co. v. Armstrong 52 Fogler may maintain this suit exist? There
Pa. 282; Del. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 128 Pa. has (1) been a death occasioned by negli308.
gence; (2) no action has been brought by
ROBERT STUCKER and J. AUSTIN Surthe deceased in his lifetime. The third
LIVAN for the plaintiff.
Under Act April 15, 1851, the plaintiff condition presented by the act is that the
as widow of John Fogler, has a right of plaintiff shall be the widow. A widow is
action-Act April 15, 1851, 2 P. & L. 3233;
'awoman who has lost her husband by
Moe v. Smiley, 12.5 Pa. 136; P. R. R. v.
death."-29 Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law 119;
Adams, 55 Pa. 499; P. R. R. v. Henderson,
Com. v. Powell, 51 Pa. 440. Whether a
51 Pa. 323; P. R. R. v. Zerbe, 33 Pa. 328;
wife surviving her husband shall be a
Fink v. Garman, 40 Pa. 97; Birch v. P. C.
& S. R. R., 165 Pa. 339; Catawissa R. R. widow, does not depend upon the length
Co. v. Armstrong, 52 Pa. 282.
the circumstances
The amount of damages is not excessive of the coverture, or upon
-Gross v. Traction Co., 18 Pa. C. C. 29; which led to or accompanied the marriage.
Mrs. Hendricks was engaged to John
Del. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 128 Pa. 308.
Fogler before the accident. The marriage
OPINION OF THE COURT.
three days before his death was in execuJohn Fogler, 69 years of age, in good tion of the previous contract to marry.
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Whether it would or would not have happened, had Fogler been destitute of property, it would be idle to speculate. The
motives for particular marriages may be
numerous. It is not the office of the courts
to analyze them, or to pass sentence on
their worthiness. The marital relation is
established by the marriage, under whatever inducement it was undergone. Mrs.
Fogler is the widow of John Fogler.
Gross v. Electric Traction Company, 18
Pa. C. C. 29.
"The widow, says the Act of 1851, may
maintain an action." To be a "widow"
is the only qualification which the plaintiff
must have. No minimum duration of the
coverture which has been ended by the
death, no particular age, no degree of poverty needs to have existed or to exist. The
right of action being conferred by the
statute, the court can not take from it, by
requiring other conditions than those
which the statute imposes. Absence of a
cause of action, therefore, is not a cause for
granting a new trial to the defendant.
Are the damages excessive? There was
given no express evidence of damage. The
marriage, the age of Fogler, his good
health and life expectancy, his death by
reason of the accident, were proven by the
plaintiff. it was not necessary to show
that he possessed any "specially or exceptionally good qualities, as with propriety
she might have done, if the subject of her
loss had been a horse or other animal."
The jury might, without evidence, infer
that he was an " ordinarily industrious and
useful" husband, "capable of discharging
properly the duties of his position." Delaware, etc., R. R. Co. v. Jones, 128 Pa. 308.
In that case, the jury awarded $3000 to a
husband for the death of a wife who was
sixty-five years old.
It was suggested that the damages were
excessive because of the brevity of the
marital relation terminated by the death,
and because it was begun after the accident and in view of the approaching
death. The amount of the damage may
be proportioned to the probable future
continuance, but not to the past continuance, of the married state. If there had
been no contract to marry before the accident, we should think the damage excessive, if indeed more than nominal damages
could be recovered. In that. case, Mrs.

Hendricks would have acquired by the
marriage, a dying man, whose pecuniary
value to her would be inappreciable. But
she had obtained his pledge of marriage
before the accident, and as against the
negligent company she had a right to receive him, as husband, sound and well.
In Gross v. Electric Traction Company,
18 Pa. C. C. 29, there had been a meretricious cohabitation between Mrs. Gross
and Benedict Gross for seven years. The
accident befel him, that shortly afterwards
resulted in his death. A few days before
his death at the age of sixty-nine years
the marriage took place. She was permitted by the court to recover a verdict of
$3,500.
The rule for a new trial is discharged.

UNION R. & N. WORKS vs. KEYSTONE
R. & N. WORKS.
Assigned estate-Distributionof assetsRight of stockholder to participate"General Manager" not entitled to preference under Act 9 Apr., 1872, and supplements.
H. W. SAVIDGE and H. FRANKLIN
KANTNER for the exceptants.
(1) Mobus, being a stockholder, can have.
no share of the funds for distribution until
all outside creditors have been satisfied.Hart's Appeal, 96 Pa. 374;Pardee's Appeal,
100 Pa. 408; Christian's Appeal, 102 Pa. 189.
(2) A "general manager" cannot be allowed preference over general creditors,
even if he can claim with them, because
his employment is not such labor as comes
within the Act of 1872 and supplements,
allowing a preference to labor claimants.Pa. & Del. R.R. Co.'v. Leuffer, 84 Pa. 168.
:.CLAY BEISTEL and H: H. GRISWOLD
for the Auditor's report.
(1) Stockholders may sustain the double
relation of creditor and shareholder and are
entitled to aproratashare of the assets.Patterson v. Wyomissing Mining Co., 40
Pa. 117; Means' Appeal, 85 Pa. 75; Craig's
Appeal, 92 Pa. 396; Schlandecker's Appeal,
22 W. N. C. 37.
(2) Mobusis entitled to preferenceunder
Actof 1872andsupplements.-Llewellyn's
Appeal, 103 Pa. 458; Scull's Appeal, 115 Pa.
141; National Bank v. Oxford Co. 2 Pa. C.
C. 360; Union v. Gracie, 7 Pa. C. C. 188.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Keystone R. & N. Works, a corporation, made an assignment of its property
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for the benefit of its creditors to K. A.
Lovell. At a subsequent sale $500 was realized. The claims against the corporation,
when the assignment was made, amounted
to $1300. Among them was a claim by F.
E. Mlobus, for wages, of $125. Mobus besides being astockholder in the corporation
had been the "general manager" of its
business, having contracted with the company to receive $45 per month. Though
he was not bound by his contract to do so,
he in fact nearly every day performed some
manual labor in the works. He insisted
that he was entitled to be paid in full, in
preference to other creditors. The auditor
has awarded him the preference. The other
creditors except (a) that Mobus, being a
stockholder, should be postponed to nonstockholding creditors; (b) that he is not
entitled to a preference.
(a) One who is a stockholder may likewise be a creditor of the corporation, and
as such creditor, may resort to the remedies
to which other creditors may resort. Being
a mortgagee, he may sue upon the mortgage. Gordon v. Preston, 1 W. 385. Having a policy of insurance from the company
of which he is a member, he may maintain
debt upon it.-Ins. Co. v. Connor, ]7 Pa.
136. But, not only may he, as against the
corporation, enforce the payment of his
debt. He may do this as against creditors.
Thus, stockholders of a bank may deposit
moneys in it. The bank assigning for creditors, they may claim upon their deposits
ratably with non-shareholding depositors,
and so reduce the dividends of the latter.
Craig's Appeal, 92 Pa. 396. Depositors in
a building association shared ratably in its
assets after it had become insolvent, although some of them were not, and some
of them were, stockholders. -Criswell's
Appeal, 100 Pa. 488. A stockholder, mortgagee, was permitted to enforce his mortgage to the disadvantage of an outside
-creditor.-Gordon v. Preston, 1 W. 385. It
may be said, generally, that a creditor does
not, over against non-shareholding creditors, lose any of his rights because he is also
a shareholder.-Thompson, Corporations,
4459, 4460. Such creditors shared ratably
with other creditors in Hopkins' Appeal,
90 Pa. 69. Wages claimants are entitled to
a preference, although they are also stockholders-Nat. Bank v. Car Co., 2Pa. C. C.
360. In Christian's Appeal, 102 Pa. 184,

the treasurer, as creditor, was preferred to
shareholders who claimed to be creditors
for the withdrawal value of their shares in
a building association. This demand grew
out of their ownership of stock. For that
reason they were postponed to the treasurer. In Hart's Appeal, 96 Pa. 355, the
claim also was derived from astocksubscription. For work done, the claimant was to
receive shares or transportation certificates.
The latter would entitle him to a share of
the gross earnings; the former, of the net
earnings of the railroad. Because of the
peculiar form of the credit, he was postponed to external creditors. Mobus is not
precluded from recovering $12-5 because he
was a stockholder.
(b) Is he entitled to a preference on the
ground that his demand is founded on a
labor contract?
The act of April 22nd, 1854, 2 P. & L. 4798,
directs that in all assignments, the wages
of miners, mechanics and laborers shall be
preferred. While this acv is not repealed
by that of April 9th, 1872, except in so far
as it is supplied by the latter act, Hall's
Estate, 30 W. N. C. 88, 'Mobus is not a miner, mechanic or laborer. The act of 1872,
and its supplement of June 8, 1887, have
been fully supplied by that of Mlay 12, 1891,
2 P. & L. 4787. The act of 1891 gives a
preference to the amount of $200 to all
moneys due "for labor and services rendered by a mechanic, miner, servant girl,
or other servant or helper, porter, hostler,
laundryman, teamster, clerk in stores or
elsewhere, hand laborer, farm laborer, any
other kind of laborer, printer, apprentice"
and all other tradesmen hired for wages or
salary. F. E. Alobus plainly does not fall
under any of these categories. Heis not a
miner or mechanic, a clerk, a hand laborer
or a farm laborer. He is not, in the ordinary sense of the word, a "laborer" of any
kind. "Other tradesmen" must be interpreted by the context, Yoscitur a sociis.
The tradesmen meant are "other" than
printers, apprentices, farm laborers, etc.
It is impossible to label Mr. 'Mobus with
any of these designations. It is true that
he worked, he labored, with head, hands
and feet. To buy material, to select workmen, to set them to their tasks, to allot
them their wages, to supervise them, is, in
one sense, to work, to labor. But, he who
does these things is not a "laborer" or a
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life and to receive the interest annually.
The auditor has awarded payment of the
debts in full, to the widow one-third of
the balance, and to each of the sons onethird of the remaining two-thirds of the
balance. The sons except.
As the personalty and realty of a decedent are liable for his debts, it is immaterial so far as creditors are concerned
whether the proceeds of the policy are to
be deemed personal or real estate. They
are at all events applicable to the satisfacESTATE OF JOHN HENRY, DECEASED.
tion of creditors. Nichol's Appeal, 128 Pa.
428.
Auditor's distribution- When insurance
The more difficult problem is, whether
money is regarded as realty.
after debts are paid the residue of the
money realized on a policy of fire insurJ. AUGUSTUS SCHMIDT and CHARLES F.
ance is to be distributed as personalty or
RALSTON for the exceptants.
as realty. The importance of this problem
The insurance money in the hands of
it need scarcely be remarked, from
arises,
the administrator must be regarded as
the difference between the course of
realty.-Nichol's Appeal, 128 Pa. 428;
Wyman v. Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253; Power
descent of personalty and of realty on the
v. Power, 7 Watts 212.
death of the recent owner. Did both
J. F. ScoTT and G. H. MOYER for the species of estate pass to the same persons
Auditor's distribution.
in the same quantities of interest, itwould
After payment of decedent's debts, balnever be necessary to classify the property
ance of insurance money should be distrias real or as personal.
buted as personalty.-Nichol's Appeal,
128 Pa. 428.
Insurance is a contract, obliging one of
the parties to it to pay to the other a sum of
OPINION OF THE COURT.
money, or to make repair or restoration of
John Henry took out a fire insurance
property in the happening of an injury
policy on a mill for $10,000, for the period
to or destruction of it. It is a chose in
of five years. He died a year afterwards.
action, and is personal property. But
A widow and three sons survived him.
there are not wanting instances of personal
property being so connected with land, as
His personal property amounted to$4,720,
to receive for the purpose of inheritance
Within six months
his debt to $7,900.
after his death, a fire totally destroyed the
the properties of land. Heirlooms, keys,
mill, and the loss suffered reached the sum
deeds, fixtures not physically annexed,
of $17,000. The policy being payable to
are specimens. A testator may destine a
John Henry, or his executors, administrasum of money to be employed in purchastors, or assigns, the insurance company,
ing land for X, and by such destination
electing to pay the money rather than to
give it, the money, the course of descent
rebuild, as under the policy it might have
that the land which it is appointed to
done, paid $10,000 to the administrator.
purchase, would take. Should X die before
He filed his account in which he charged
the purchase is made, the fund would
himself with the $4,720 and the $10,000,
descend to her heir and not to her adminand claimed credit for expenses, commis- istrator. Her husband would have cursions, etc., amounting to $800. The bal- tesy in it. Sweetapple v. Bindon, 2 Vern.
536; 6Am. & Eng. Encyc. Law, 671. Such
ance acknowledged was therefore $13,920.
Before the auditor, appointed to districonnection of money with land is ordinarily effected by wills. There is no reabute this balance, the creditors claimed to
be paid in full. The widow demanded
son for holding that it may not be otherone-third of the balance, absolutely, the
wise accomplished. Did the contract of
insurance effect such a connection?
sons claimed each one-third of the whole,
subject to the right of the widow to have
The insurance is a contract for indemone-third of the whole invested during her
nity in case of injury to the land. None
"tradesman."

Mlobus did perform some

manual labor, but as he was not employed
to do so, the wages he is now claiming were
not for such labor. We think that the
second exception to the auditor's report
must be sustained and we re-commit the
report to the auditor with the direction
that he divide the fund ratably between
M1obus and the other creditors.
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OVERSEERS OF THE POOR OF WALKbut the owner can suffer that injury. It
ER TOWNSHIP vs. OVERSEERS, ETC.,
can hardly have been intended that there
OF SPRING TOWNSHIP.
should be a. divorce between the ownership of the land, by which alone, a damSettlement of pauper-Ju?sdiction of
age to it would be an injury, and the
Court-Payment of tax by political party
right to receive the money. To one not
suffering the loss, it would not be an indem- -Liability for relief of pauper.
nity. Hence, if after taking an insurance,
Case stated.
the insured contracts to convey the premJOHN HARRIS WILLIAmS and HORACE
ises, and if by such contract the insur- CODINGTON
for plaintiff.
ance is not forfeited, the assured will,should
No settlement has been gained in Walka fire occur before the conveyance, receive er township and it is therefore not bound
the money in trust for his vendee. Farm- to furnish relief.-Act of June 13, 1836, 9,
er's Mutual Ins. Co. v. Graybill, 74 Pa. 17; 2 P. & L. 3549.
A person to acquire a settlement by payInsurance Co. v. Updegraff, 21 Pa. 513; ment
of taxes, etc., must pay such for two
Reed v. Lukens, 44 Pa. 200; H ill v. Cum- full years in succession and must also
"come to inhabit."-Cowanshannock
berland Valley Mutual Protection Co., 59
Pa. 474; Compare Walsh v. Packard, 165 Township Overseers v. Valley Township
Overseers, 152 Pa. 504.
Mass. 189.
It is not enough that the tax was paid.
By analogy, when an owner insures his by an agent of a political party.-Lawrence
land for a term of years, he so connects
Overseers v. Delaware Overseers, 148 Pa.
the money that may be realized upon the 380; Dallas Township Poor District, v.
policy with the land, that in case of fire Eaton Township Poor District, 161 Pa. 143.
WINGERT and JULIAN C. WALKafter his death the money will be payable ERA.forA.defendant.
to those who take his land as heirs or deThe Court of Common Pleas has nojurisvisees. In contracting for insurance, he diction in this case.-Directors of the Poor
must be understood to contract for who- of Chester Co. v. 'Malany, 64 Pa. 144;
ever, consistently with the terms of the Sugarloaf v. Schuylkill, 44 Pa. 481; DelaTownship v. Greenwood, 66 Pa. 63;
policy, shall become the owner during its ware
Overseers of Blair Co. v. Clarion Borough,
term, whether they become such by con- 91 Pa. 431; Nippenose v. Jersey Shore, 48
tract, by inheritance, or by devise. Al- Pa. 402; Renovo v. Half-Moon, 78 Pa. 301.
It does not appear that the act of June
though Nichol's Appeal, 128 Pa. 428, is
1836, 9, P. & L. 3.549, was complied
not authority for this position, Wyman v. 13,
with, so as to give Grooms a settlement in
Wyman, 26 N. Y. 253, cited therein, is. Spring township.
We are convinced by its reasoning. The
auditor was in error, in allowing to the
OPINION OF COURT.
widow one-third of the residue of the inThomas Grooms was assessed and paid
surance money, after paying the debts. taxes in Spring Township in 1889, 1890 and
She should simply receive the interest an- 1891. Since 1891 and down to the fall of
nually on one-third of the fund during her 1895 he moved around from one poor disand county to another gaining a resilife. The sons will be entitled to equal trict
dence, and being assessed for taxes, noparts of this third immediately upon her where. In the fall of 1895 he moved to
death, and are now entitled to equalparts of Walker Township, Centre county. He
the other two-thirds. The report is there- never paid any rent here and although he
assessed twice he never paid any tax,
fore recommitted to the auditor with a was
but before the election of Nov. 3, 1896, his
a direction that he amend his distribution
cointy tax of 12 cents was paid by a poliin accordance with this opinion.
tician in order to secure for the Republican
party a vote. On the 28th day of Decemer, 1896, he died and was buried on the
314t of December. A widow and three
children survive him. The overseers of the
poor of Walker township were requested
to pay, and they paid $22, the funeral expenses. They were asked to pay no other
bills. The widow and children of Thomas
Grooms are now in need. No order for
their relief has been obtained. This case
stated is filed in the common pleas in
order to procure the opinion of the court
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as to whether Walker township or Spring
township is liable for their support.
Walker township cannot compel Spring
to provide for these poor persons unless
Spring was the last place of settlement of
Thomas Grooms. The 9th section of the
act of June 13, 1836, 2 P. & L. 3549 enumerates eight classes of facts, any one Qf
which will constitute a settlement. The
only facts stated in the case to show that
Grooms was ever settled in Spring, is his
paying taxes, assessed on him, in that
township in 1889, 1890, 1891. The act of
1836 provides that a settlement shall be
gained by "any such person,-' i. e. as shall
come to inhabit in the district, "who shall
be charged with and pay his proportion of
any public taxes or levies for two years
successively."
Such charging with and
payment of taxes must be accompanied
by inhabitancy, otherwise they will not
constitute settlement. One who resides near
the line in township A. but pays taxes in
the adjacent township B., will not acquire
a settlement in B. Cowanshannock Township Overseers v. Valley Township Overseers, 152 Pa. 504. Conversely, residing
two or three yearsin a township does not
make a settlement, unless taxes are paid.
Dallas Township Poor District v. Eaton
Township Poor District, 161 Pa. 142. The
case stated, therefore, does not disclose
facts necessary to make Spring Township
the district of Grooms' settlement.
Walker township could not compel
Spring to support the family of Grooms,
if they have gained a settlement in the
former. Have they gained such settlement? The third fact which makes a
settlement, is the bona fide taking a lease
of any real estate of the yearly value of
ten dollars, the payment of that amount
of rent, and the habitation of the leased
premises for one whole year. The case
avers that Grooms "never p aid any rent"
in Walker township. Settlement by this
means, therefore, was not obtained. Was
it obtained by inhabitancy and payment
of taxes? 'It does not distinctly appear
that he inhabited Walker township. We
incline to the opinion that as office holding must continue for "one whole year,"
when it is depended on to make a settlement, inhabitancy with payment of
taxes must continue for two full years. It
is certain that Grooms did not inhabit
Walker township for two full years. Re
moved intoit in the fall of 1895, and died on
December 28, 1896, within sixteen months.
Did he pay his proportion of taxes for two
years successively? He was assessed in
1895 and in 1896. He paid neither of the
taxes thus assessed. If from the statement
we are to understand that the "politician"
paid one of these taxes only, the other was
never paid by anybody. Paymeilt of the
taxes for two successive years is indispensable. Grooms then, did not gain a settlement in Walker.

But if we are to understand the statement to aver that the taxes of the two
years were paid by the "politician,"
such payment would be unavailing. The
taxes must be paid by the assessed person
himself or his agent, or the payment must
be ratified by him, e. g. by repaying the
person who paid them, or by giving him
a security for the repayment. Laurence
Township Overseers v. Delaware Township Overseers, 148 Pa. 380; Dallas Township Poor District v. Eaton Township
Poor District, 161 Pa. 142. Accepting the
receipt for the tax, on election day, and
thereupon voting, is not a ratification. 161
Pa. 142. Grooms therefore was not at his
death
settled in Walker township.
Walker has a right to exoneration from
some other poor district. The misfortune
is, that it is not made to appear that that
district is Spring.
This acti6n is brought and case stated
filed in the common pleas. The controversy is between two poor districts with
respect to their liability inter se, ?or the
support of the poor. We think the court
of Quarter Sessions the more appropriate
court to entertain jurisdiction. Walker
should have sued out from the Quarter
Sessions, a rule on Spring to show cause.
Directors of the Poor of Chester County v.
Malony, 64 Pa. 144; Sugarloaf v. Schuylkill, 44 Pa. 481; Nippenose v. Jersey Shore,
48 Pa. 402; Marion Township v. Spring

Township, 50 Pa. 308; Overseers of Blair
County v. Clarion Borough, 91 Pa. 431;
Renovo Overseer v. Half Moon Overseers,
78 Pa. 301; Cowanshannock Township
Overseers v. Valley Township Overseers,
152 Pa. 504; Dallas Township Poor District
v. Eaton Township Poor District, 161 Pa.
142; North Beaver Township v. Big Beaver Township, 8 Pa. C. C. 82.
Even if the common pleas had jurisdiction of a controversy between poor districts, no judgment could be entered on
this case stated. It does not contain the
elements out of which a judgment can be
constructed. The purpose seems to be to
obtain the opinion, not the judgment, of
the.court. So far as appears, Walker has,
as yet, expended nothing iii the support of
Grooms' widow and children; no order of
relief imposing them in that district has
been made. No order of removal to Spring
has been made, without which whatever
may have been expended by Walker could
not be recovered from Spring. No jud gment that Spring pay to Walker any delinite sum of money can be entered. For
this reason, the case stated is quashed.
Commonwealth v. Howard, 149 Pa. 302;
Smith v. Eline, A D. R. 490; Pittston Borough School District v. Pittston Borough,
5 Kulp. 440; M
Nudey v. County of Schuylkill, 2 Leg. Rec. 178; Dunn, Wood & Dunn
v. Meixeil, 1 Leh. V. 168; Township of
Rush v. Schuylkill County, 100 Pa. 356.
Case stated, quashed.
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Geo. Edward Mills was born in Danville, Pa.,
1869. Having graduated from the high school
of that borough, he attended the Danville
Academy, and afterwards entered Dickinson
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